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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
WIFE'S CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM
For almost four hundred years the law
has provided a shelter for the rights of
society's basic unit, the family. However,
the amount of protection afforded has
varied, depending upon which member's
interest was being threatened. While the
husband's rights of consortium were given
early legal recognition, the wife's action
instituted because of negligent injury to
her husband has, until comparatively
recently, been barred. The patent dis-
parity of treatment, now considered so
significant as to violate the federal con-
stitutional guarantees of equal protection,
has been the by-product of a fundamental
misconception of the basic theory under-
lying the consortium action. Source
background concerning the husband's
consortium interest will be given to show
that whatever may have been the reason-
ing heretofore given to justify denial of
the wife's action, such a conclusion is no
longer plausible, but continues because of
the judicial refusal to accept the changed
meaning of the right.
Consortium at Common Law
For centuries, the husband exercised a
guardianship role over the wife's person-
age. The statement by one court that a
sixteenth century woman was "a creature
• . . of limited intellectual attainments or
possibilities" 1 is the closest thing to a
reason given for this spousal responsibility.
Because of this attitude, a woman's legal
entity was suspended and merged into
that of her husband during coverture.2
This merger led to her legal inability to
own property or to contract, and even
prevented her from suing for her own
personal injuries since the proceeds of
the suit were considered property, and as
such, belonged to her husband.'
Whatever may have been the merits of
the guardianship theory, it took but one
1 Montgomery v. Stephen, 359 Mich. 33, 38,
101 N.W.2d 227, 229 (1960).
" Yonner v. Adams, 53 Del. 229, 167 A.2d 717
(1961).
3 C. BURDICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 24, at 148
(4th ed. 1926).
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short step for the wife to be considered
as part of the husband's property.4 This
sprang from analogizing the wife's status
to that of a servant. It was well estab-
lished by the early seventeenth century
that a man could bring an action for
intentional injury to or enticement away
of a servant,5 and clearly the wife owed
the husband certain services, the most
readily identifiable being sexual inter-
course. 6 Thus, in Chomley and Conges
case,7 the court held that a good cause
of action was presented where the husband
sued, without joinder of his wife, for dam-
ages sustained by her as a result of assault
and battery.
Any remaining doubt as to the validity
of the husband's right to sue for inter-
ference with his family rights came in
Guy v. Livesey 3 wherein plaintiff sued
for an assault on himself and his wife
"per quod consortium . . . amisit." " De-
fendant moved for dismissal of the hus-
band's claim based on his wife's injury
or, in the alternative, sought joinder of
the wife lest he "be twice punished for
one and the same battery, if the plaintiff
here should recover." 10 The court, in
dismissing this contention, held that
,Best v. Samuel Fox & Co., Ltd. [1952] A.C.
716, 731-32; Brett, Consortium and Servitium:
A History and Some Proposals, 29 AUSTL. L.
J. 321, 322 (1955).
5 Brett, supra note 4, at 322.
6Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30
COLUM. L. REV. 651, 655-56 (1930).
7 74 Eng. Rep. 748 (1586). See Brett, supra
note 4, at 325.
"79 Eng. Rep. 428 (1618).
• "Whereby he lost the company of his wife."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1294 (4th ed. 1951).
t'Guy v. Livesey, 79 Eng. Rep. 428 (1618).
the action was well brought; for the ac-
tion is not brought in respect of the
harm done to the wife, but it is brought
for the particular loss of the husband,
for that he lost the company of his wife,
which is only a damage and loss to him-
self, for which he shall have this action,
as the master shall have for the loss of
his servant's service. .... 11
The significance of this holding is its
explicit statement that the husband, upon
injury to his wife, has suffered a loss
peculiar to himself, separate and inde-
pendent from the physical injury suffered
by the wife. It is clearly not the case
of an assignment of a piece of the wife's
cause of action, but rather, it is the case
of one tort giving rise to two causes of
action since the distinct and separate
rights of two persons have been violated.1"
11Id. at 428 (emphasis added). It is gener-
ally agreed that the common-law action of
consortium also allowed recovery for loss of
service and sexual intercourse. 1 F. HARPER
& F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 8.9, at 635
(1956). See also, W PROSSER, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 118, at 895 (3d ed. 1964).
12 "Thus, any tort committed by a third person
resulting in bodily harm to the wife is action-
able by the husband . . . distinct from the
tort against the wife in her own right ....
F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 11, at 636.
This concept was so well recognized at com-
mon law that proper pleading required the
husband to join with his wife in bringing suit
for her injuries, whereas if the husband sued
for his loss of consortium, such joinder was
improper. Blair v. Seitner Dry Goods Co.,
184 Mich. 304, 151 N.W. 724 (1915); Brett,
supra note 4, at 326. The distinctions are
pointed up in Rogers v. Goddard, 89 Eng.
Rep. 925 (1682), wherein plaintiff husband
successfully brought suit for loss of consortium
based on the defendant's assault and battery on
his wife despite the fact that any suit by hus-
band and wife for her own injuries would
have been barred due to her having consented
to the assault.
Wives at common law had no right
corresponding to that of the husband for
her own loss of consortium upon physical
injury to her husband; or at least, as has
been argued, none was recognized because
of her procedural disabilities. '- One
reason for this denial is given by Black-
stone:
notice is only taken of the wrong done
to the superior of the parties related,...
[o]ne reason for which may be this:
that the inferior hath no kind of prop-
erty in the company, care, or assistance
of the superior, as the superior is held
to have in those of the inferior; and
therefore the inferior can suffer no loss
or injury.14
Thus as the wife had an inferior interest
in the marital relationship, injury to such
interest could not be a compensable harm
since, in effect, nothing worth compensat-
ing had been injured.
A further explanation for the denial of
a consortium action to the wife is found
in the leading case of Lynch v. Knight."
There defendant made certain defamatory
remarks about the morals of plaintiff's
wife on the basis of which her husband
had turned her out of his house. She
joined with her husband and brought suit
alleging as the required special damages
her loss of consortium. Thus two ques-
tions were raised on appeal: first, did she
have a cause of action for her loss; and
second, was the loss too remote to con-
stitute special damages. While a majority
of the court chose to rest its conclusion
, "Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of
Consortium, 22 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1923).
143 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 143.
'5 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (1861).
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on the premise that the results were not
the natural and probable consequences of
the words spoken, Lord Wensleydale met
the main issue and denied the wife re-
covery since the nature of consortium was
of a different character when brought by
the wife than when brought by the hus-
band. Although professing that the re-
lation of husband and wife was dissimilar
to that of master and servant, he noted
that
[t]he assistance of the wife in the con-
duct of the household . . . [which] re-
sembles the service of a hired domestic,
. . is of material value, capable of
being estimated in money .... 16
The value of the services lost being mea-
surable, the husband had a good cause of
action since it was "the protection of such
material interests that the law chiefly at-
tends." 17 However, since the husband
owed no services to his wife, she sustained
only a loss of society of "which the law
cannot take cognizance." "I It is readily
apparent, therefore, that at common law
the service element was the predominant
factor in support of the husband's action
and in opposition to the wife's claim."'
r Id. at 863.
17 Id.
18 Id. Any loss of earnings sustained by the
husband, which would incidentally deprive
her of support, was recoverable by him
in his own personal injury action, and were
it also to serve as the economic basis of her
action, it would amount to a double recovery.
See Feneff v. New York Cent. & H. R.R., 203
Mass. 311, 89 N.E. 436 (1909).
"1 Golden v. R.L. Green Paper Co., 44 R.I.
231, 116 A. 579 (1922); Holbrook, supra notc
13, at 7. The loss of service was . . . the
basis of the husband's recovery, the sentimental
aspects of his recovery being in the nature of
parasitic damages. When his economic loss
had been eliminated, the argument is that his
right to recover for purely emotional harm
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The Married Women's Acts and the Right
to Consortium
By the end of the nineteenth century.
social attitudes regarding the female had
changed sharply. The sexual inferiority
premise which had, as its consequence,
the master-servant family structure, was
dying. This produced a two-fold result:
first, the Married Women's Acts (herein-
after referred to as the Acts); and second,
a complete change in the meaning of con-
sortium. The former were designed to
give legal recognition to the wife's right
to a legal existence separate and apart
from that of her husband. These Acts
either contain specific provisions allowing
her to contract,20 to own property,2' and
to sue or be sued without joinder of her
husband 22 or are couched in general
terms, such as "[wiomen shall retain the
same legal existence and legal personality
after marriage as before .... ", 23
This development was, of course, not
without effect on the family structure. It
meant that in legal contemplation, at
least as to property rights, the wife was
on a par with her husband.2 4  However,
should also vanish." I F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, supra note 11, at 638.
This denial of recovery for mere sentimental
injury was in accord with the generally pre-
vailing tort rule that no recovery would be
granted for emotional distress unaccompanied
by physical impact or injury to the person.
C. BURDICK, supra note 3, f 10, at 56.
20See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-16 (Supp.
1967).
21 See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. ch. 209, § 26.161
(1957).
22 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 1 (Smith-
Hurd 1959).
21 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 519.01 (1947).
21 Duffy v. Lipsman-Fulkerson & Co., 200 F.
Supp. 71 (D. Mont. 1961).
courts are sharply divided as to the par.-
ticular effect of these Acts on family
rights, such as consortium. The most re-
actionary view is that the Acts brought
about no change at all in the consortium
area 2 so that, in effect, the master-ser-
vant concept is still applied.2 6 At the
other extreme is the view that the Acts
have abolished the reasoning behind the
loss of consortium action entirely since
the wife is no longer viewed as the
property of her husband.2 7
An examination of these views is in
order to show that the extreme positions
taken by each has been the result of a
complete misconception of the role of
the Acts and their relation to consortium.
It must be remembered at the outset that
the Acts were no more than a manifesta-
tion of the social concepts of the day as
they pertained to mere property rights.
Thus, those cases holding that the Acts
create no new consortium rights as be-
tween husband and wife are correct.
However, the fallacy exists insofar as
they view the Acts as the only possible
means by which family rights could be
extended to the wife. The Acts were but
one outward manifestation of the change
in the relationship of husband and wife,
another being a new conception of mem-
ber purpose in the marital union, a change
from a simple support-service relationship
into one of
2:, Snodgrass v. Cherry-Burrell Corp., 103 N.H.
56, 164 A.2d 579 (1960).
26People's Home Telephone Co. v. Cockrum,
182 Ala. 547, 62 So. 86 (1913).
27 Criqui v. Blaw-Knox Co., 208 F. Supp. 605
(D. Ken. 1962) (dictum); Seagraves v. Legg,
147 W. Va. 331, 127 S.E.2d 605 (1962)
(dictum).
[c]onjugal fellowship of husband and
wife, and the right of each to the com-
pany, affection and aid of the other in
every conjugal relation. 2 s
A more moderate argument reasons
that the wife could not sue for loss of
consortium at common law because of her
inability to maintain a cause of action in
her own name, and, by removing this
disability, the Acts allowed a remedy for
a pre-existing right. However, this view
also appears to be incorrect since this
"disability" could have been easily cir-
cumvented by the wife's joining in an
action with her husband. Thus, if there
were any such recognizable wrong, such
an action surely would have been at-
tempted.29
Thus the Acts neither created any new
rights in the family, nor removed any
disabilities so as to allow the implementa-
tion of a previously existing right. They
were merely an impulse of social change
as regards the property rights of the
spouses. The real change in consortium
came with the acceptance of the modern
view of mutual marital rights as dis-
tinguished from the almost primitive sup-
port-service concept. Much difficulty
28 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 382 (4th ed.
1951).
2Page v. Winter, 240 S.C. 516, 126 S.E.2d
570 (1962). A point sometimes mentioned in
support of the proposition that the right of the
wife to consortium existed at common law
was its recognition in ecclesiastical tribunals
wherein the wife was allowed to sue the hus-
band for abandonment. W. PROSSER, supra note
11, at 903.
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could undoubtedly have been avoided had
new terminology been used to represent
the modem meaning attached to the word
"consortium" since its continued use has
served only to confuse the issues by
reason of its onerous common law con-
notations. Perhaps the clearest example
of this can be found in the instance of
those states which have abolished the con-
sortium action either judicially 30 or legis-
latively 31 for both husband and wife on
the premise that its basis was an outworn
theory. 2 One court recently recognized
its error and overruled two long standing
decisions barring consortium recovery due
to negligent conduct for either the hus-
band or wife, and held that she had a
sufficient interest in the marriage to merit
30Criqui v. Blaw-Knox Co., 208 F. Supp.
605 (D. Kan. 1962) (dictum); Marri v.
Stamford Street Ry., 84 Conn. 9, 78 A.
582 (1911); Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co.,
224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E.2d 611 (1945) (wife's
ability to hold earnings separately from her
husband because of the Acts meant that the
husband was no longer entitled to her services,
and without such economic loss his (or her)
consortium action for negligent injury had no
basis); Martin v. United Electric Rys., 71 R.I.
137, 42 A.2d 897 (1945).
alVA. CODE ANN. §55-36 (1950).
32Courts denying recovery to the wife have
also intimated that the action is obsolete and
should be abolished even as to the husband.
See, e.g., Criqui v. Blaw-Knox Co., 208 F.
Supp. 605 (D. Kan. 1962) and Kronenbitter
v. Washburn Wire Co., 4 N.Y.2d 524, 151
N.E.2d 898, 176 N.Y.S.2d 354 (1958), over-
ruled, Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co.,
- N.Y.2d -, - N.E.2d , N.Y.S.2d -
(1968).
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protection, whether or not the right had
existed at common law.
33
Recognition of the Right of Consortium
via Intentional Torts
Nevertheless, recognition of the wife's
interest in the marital relationship was
slow in coming, the earliest recognition of
her consortium interest arising in the
sphere of intentional torts. Even if courts
were either unable or unwilling to realize
the existence of her co-equal interest in
the marriage, they discerned a distinction
between an "indirect" injury to her con-
sortium interest by negligent injury to
her spouse, and a tort whose malice
could have been aimed nowhere but di-
rectly at the wife and her marital inter--
est.3
4
Among the forms of intentional inter-
ference for which the law most commonly
granted relief were alienation of affec-
3 Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101
N.W.2d 227 (1960), overruling, Blair v. Seitner
Dry Goods Co., 184 Mich. 304, 151 N.W.
724 (1915) (husband's mere consortium re-
covery denied absent an intentional wrong)
and Harker v. Buzhouse, 254 Mich. 187, 236
N.W. 222 (1931) (neither spouse entitled to
recover). "The obstacles to the wife's action
were judge-invented and they are herewith
judge-destroyed." Id. at 49, 101 N.W.2d at
235.
34See Lockwood v. Wilson H. Lee Co., 144
Conn. 155, 128 A.2d 330 (1956); Emerson v.
Taylor, 133 Md. 192, 104 A. 538 (1918).
Compare Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1382 (1952)
("the malicious intent must be directed against
her or the marital relation itself .... ") with
Note, Judicial Treatment of Negligent Invasion
of Consortium, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1341, 1342
(1961) ("defendant's conduct need not have
been motivated by a desire to disrupt the
family. Rather, liability will attach when such
injury is a clear consequence of his actions.").
tion, :1 criminal conversation,36 and ad-
diction to drugs 17 and alcoholic bever-
ages.38  The reasoning underlying this
recovery has been best expressed in
Bennett v. Bennett,39 an action brought
by the wife seeking damages for enticing
away her husband.
Each is entitled to the comfort, com-
panionship and affection of the other.
The rights of the one and the obligat.on.i
of the other spring from the marriage
contract, are mutual in character and
attach to the husband as husband and to
the wife as wife. Any interference with
these rights, whether of the husband or
of the wife, is a violation, not only of a
natural right, but also of a legal right
arising out of the marriage relation. 40
Despite this modem language, courts were
unable to take the final step and extend
its obvious implications: granted the
35See, e.g., Clow v. Chapman, 125 Mo. 101,
28 S.W. 328 (1894); Acchione v. Acchione,
376 Pa. 36, 101 A.2d 642 (1954).
3 See, e.g., Baldridge v. Matthew, 378 Pa.
566, 106 A.2d 809 (1954); Fennell v. Little-
john, 240 S.C. 189, 125 S.E.2d 408 (1962).
3 Flandermeyer v. Cooper, 85 Ohio St. 327,
98 N.E. 102 (1912) (continued sale of mor-
phine over wife's objection); Moberg v. Scott,
38 S.D. 422, 161 N.W. 998 (1917) (sale of
opium against wife's wishes and in violation
of statute).
3 Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P.2d 147
(1940) (sales to a known drunkard interfered
with her property right and such claim could
not be defeated by any allegation of con-
tributory negligence on her husband's part since
his loss of volition over consumption was at-
tributable to the defendant's original sale);
Swanson v. Ball, 67 S.D. 161, 290 N.W. 482
(1940) (recovery granted for loss of consortium
and expenses incurred by the wife prior to her
husband's death for continued sales over her
protest).
3!) 116 N.Y. 584, 23 N.E. 17 (1889).
40d. at 590, 23 N.E. at 18.
special merits of allowing compensation
for intentional interference with the
marital relationship, the effect on the
wife's interest could well be the same
where the interference was by a negligent
act.
The Breakthrough: Hitafler v. Argonne
Co.
By the middle of the twentieth century,
only one state had taken the step forward
and allowed recovery, only to reverse it-
self four years later and deny the exis-
tence of such a cause of action.41 Another
court had been equally divided on the
question .1 2  However, in 1950, against a
unanimity of contrary authority elsewhere,
and on the most difficult set of facts pos-
sible, the United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit, in Hitafler
v. Argonne Co.,43 held that the wife's
complaint for loss of consortium resulting
from defendant's negligence stated a good
cause of action.4 4  In an in-depth an-
alysis, the court disposed of all arguments
previously presented for denial of the
right. Initially, it noted that previous
cases generally attributed a number of
4 Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C.
120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925), overruling, Hipp v.
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 182 N.C. 9,
108 S.E. 318 (1921).
4'McDade v. West, 80 Ga. App. 481, 56
S.E.2d 299 (1949).
-I. 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 852 (1950).
.4This same court later reversed itself in a
later case as to that portion of its holding
granting relief where the husband was covered
by workmen's compensation at the time of the
injury. Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 914 (1957).
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elements to consortium with service
viewed as the predominant factor. From
this point, courts had argued either first,
that the wife was not entitled to her
husband's services and therefore had no
cause of action, or second, that since
the Acts had allowed a woman the right
to keep the fruits of her own services,
the husband was no longer entitled to
his wife's services and therefore neither
he nor his wife could bring an action.4;
Immediately rejecting the premise of
these arguments, the court defined con-
sortium as encompassing not only serv-
ices, but also "love, affection, com-
panionship, sexual relations, etc., all
welded into a conceptualistic unity." 46
From this premise it felt constrained to
reject the previously held view that re-
covery should be allowed only upon in-
jury to one element, reasoning that re-
covery should be allowed where con-
sortium as a whole had been interfered
with. Also rejected was the concept
that the husband, in his own tort action,
indirectly recovers for any loss of his
wife's consortium and that to allow an-
other suit would amount to double re-
covery. This view was unacceptable be-
cause of its reliance on the single element
consortium concept.
Other courts, although recognizing
that negligent invasions were injurious to
the wife, still denied recovery for three
reasons: first, damages in negligence
were awarded only to the person directly
injured by the wrong, whereas the wife's
injury was viewed as indirect; second,
43Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 813
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
46Id. at 814.
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that her injuries were remote and in-
capable of measurement; and third, that
no recovery is recognized for loss of the
sentimental elements of consortium ab-
sent either a statute or a showing of loss
of service. In dismissing the first argu-
ment, the court stated that "[i]nvasion
of the consortium is an independent
wrong directly to the spouse so injured." "-,
Secondly, the remoteness argument could
not stand since the injury in question
was the natural and proximate conse-
quence of the wrongdoer's act, despite
its unforseeability. Furthermore, were the
argument valid it should also be ap-
plicable to suits by the husband. Lastly,
it found that sentiment has been allowed
as the basis of recovery since alienation
of affection and criminal conversation
were compensable despite the lack of
any service disruption.
The court found the modern rule to
be as stated in Bennett but held as in-
congruous the view that a wife was to be
allowed recovery only for intentional in-
vasions of consortium but denied for a
negligent invasion since an exemplary
penalty, to which it analogized the in-
tentional interference, cannot be levied
absent an initial actionable wrong. Fur-
thermore, as applied to the injured per-
son, it found the harm to the spouse to
be no greater where the harm was in-
tentionally, rather than negligently in-
flicted. Therefore, it concluded that in
view of the "enlightened" age in which
we live, reason required that husband
and wife have the same rights in re-
spect to marital interests. Consistent
with its view that the injury to the con-
47 Id. at 815.
sortium of one spouse is an independent
wrong, it found the fact that the hus-
band was covered by workmen's com-
pensation as immaterial and no bar to
recovery by the plaintiff in this action.
To date, a growing minority of ju-
risdictions, now numbering fifteen, have
passed on the question and either ex-
pressly or by implication adopted Hitaf-
fer.4 However, approximately twice that
number have rejected that court's deci-
sion, 49 resulting in needless discrimina-
4SThese courts may be subdivided into three
groups: first, federal courts: Duffy v. Lipsman
Fulkerson & Co., 200 F. Supp. 71 (D. Mont.
1961); Cooney v. Moomaw, 109 F. Supp. 448
(D. Neb. 1953); second, state supreme courts:
Missouri Pacific Trans. Co. v. Miller, 227
Ark. 351, 299 S.W.2d 41 (1957); Yonner
v. Adams, 53 Del. 229, 167 A.2d 717 (1961);
Dini v. Naiditch, 20 II1. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d
881 (1960); Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272,
78 N.W.2d 480 (1956); Deems v. Western
Maryland Ry., 247 Md. 95, 231 A.2d 514
(1967); Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich.
33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960); Novak v. Kansas
City Transit, Inc., 365 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1963);
Ekalo v. Constructive Service Corp., 46 N.J.
82, 215 A.2d 1 (1965); Millington v. South-
eastern Elevator Co., - N.Y.2d -, - N.E.2d
-,-N.Y.S.2d -- (1968); Hoekstra v. Helge-
land, 78 S.D. 82, 98 N.W.2d 669 (1959);
Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co.,
34 Wis. 2d 542, 150 N.W.2d 137 (1967);
and third, lower state courts: Brown
v. Georgia-Tennessee Coaches, Inc., 88 Ga.
App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 24 (1953); Hayes v.
Swenson, 14 Pa. D. & C.2d 708 (1958).
49 Later Case Service, 23 A.L.R.2d 1378
(1965 & Supp.). Some courts have chosen to
rest their decision on either stare decisis (see,
e.g., Smith v. United Construction Workers,
271 Ala. 42, 122 So. 2d 153 (1960); Miller
v. Sparks, 136 Ind. App. 148, 189 N.E.2d 720
(1963)) or on the premise that the creation of
a new cause of action is a legislative function
(see, e.g.; Potter v. Schafter, 161 Me. 340, 211
A.2d 891 (1965); Page v. Winter, 240 S.C.
516, 126 S.E.2d 570 (1962)) rather than at-
tempt to justify the present rule by reason.
tion between the sexes. Clearly, a means
of transcending such inequitable juris-
prudence was imperative.
Consortium and the Constitution
Recently, an argument not without
strong legal foundations has come into
focus. In effect, it tends to reshape
Hitaffer's equitable arguments into the
mandatory requirements of the federal
constitution. While not a new concept,
the earliest mention thereof appearing in
a 1918 dissenting opinion, ° the proposi-
tion that the denial of an actionable
right to the wife might violate the "equal
protection clause" of the fourteenth
amendment has recently been considered
by several courts.51  Of those consider-
ing the issue, three courts have extended
the cause of action to the wife indepen-
dently of the fourteenth amendment
50 Bernhardt v. Perry, 276 Mo. 612, 208 S.W.
462, 467 (1918) (dissenting opinion) (failure
to extend the cause of action to the wife where
state law allowed the husband to bring such a
suit amounted to "a practical denial of her
right to due process and the equal protection
of the law guaranteed by the Constitution of
the United States ..... Id. at 633, 208 S.W.
at 467.) See Deshotel v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry., 50 Cal.2d 664, 328 P.2d 449
(1958) (dissenting opinion).
5 Compare Moran v. Quality Aluminum Cast-
ing Co., 34 Wis.2d 542, 551, 150 N.W.2d 137,
141 (1967) ("Both logic and ... justice
require that, if a husband is to be accorded
the right . . . a wife also should be accorded
the same right .. ") with Krohn v. Richard-
son-Merrell, Inc., 406 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 978 (1967)
(denial of recovery for loss of consortium
"does not work a 'discrimination' but no
more than a practical and logical classifica-
tion").
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claim,512 three have extended the right on
the basis of the amendment's guarantee, "
while three others, all state court deci-
sions, have chosen to deny the applica-
bility of the amendment. 4  This latter
group is best represented by Seagraves v.
Legg 52 where the court disposed of the
argument by somewhat circular reason-
ing, stating that since no such cause of
action existed at common law and since
it was bound by common law it could
not now allow recovery, especially where
the Acts had abolished the reason for
the cause of action, the wife no longer
being considered property. While a de-
cision may be upheld which contravenes
federal law if resting on an adequate
and independent state ground, such is
not the case where, as here, the inde-
pendent ground utilized to side-step the
constitutional issue is without foundation
in logic.
Of the three cases to allow recovery
on a constitutional basis, the first and
only one to arise in a state court was
52Deems v. Western Maryland Ry., 247 Md.
95, 231 A.2d 514 (1968); Millington v. South-
eastern Elevator Co., - N.Y.2d -,-N.E.2d-,
- N.Y.S.2d - (1968); Moran v. Quality
Aluminium Casting Co., 34 Wis. 2d 542, 150
N.W.2d 137 (1967).
53 Karczewski v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 274
F. Supp. 169 (N.D. I11. 1967); Owen v.
Illinois Baking Corp., 260 F. Supp. 820 (D.
Mich. 1966); Clem v. Brown, 3 Ohio Misc.
167, 207 N.E.2d 389 (1965).
5' Don v. Benjamin Knapp, Inc., 306 N.Y. 675,
117 N.E.2d 128 (1954) (no reason given),
overruled, Millington v. Southeastern Elevator
Co., - N.Y.2d -,- N.E.2d -,- N.Y.S.2d-
(1968). Krohn v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 406
S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 978 (1967) (not timely raised); Seagraves
v. Legg, 147 W. Va. 331, 127 S.E.2d 605
(1962) (see discussion infra).
55 147 W. Va. 331, 127 S.E.2d 605 (1962).
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Clem v. Brown.5 6 There husband and
wife sued in a joint action, husband
seeking recovery of lost earnings and
wife alleging that "she has lost his serv-
ices and consortium." The court quickly
dismissed the wife's loss of service suit
on a double recovery rationale and then
moved quickly to the more difficult con-
sortium question, noting that were it to
follow existing state law it would have to
dismiss that action also. The court
initially pointed out that the United
States Supreme Court, in recent deci-
sions, had applied an equal protection
argument to the states via the due
process clause of the fifth amendment.
Thus, it reasoned that "although the 5th
Amendment contains no equal protec-
tion clause, it does forbid discrimination
that is so unjustifiable as to be violative
of due process. . .. " " Equal protec-
tion required recognition of the wife's
consortium action simply because her in-
jury could no longer justifiably be con-
sidered as any more remote than the
husband's . Thus the court here chose
to opt for acceptance of the constitu-
tional claim by analogizing to the due
process clause, a view which might be
criticized as an unnecessary circuity of
reasoning.
The first of two federal cases to de-
cide squarely on the applicability of the
clause was Owen v. Illinois Baking
Corp.5 8 Here the wife brought suit for
loss of consortium after her husband had
5 63 Ohio Misc. 167, 207 N.E.2d 398 (Ct.
C.P. 1965).
-,' 207 N.E.2d at 400.
55260 F. Supp. 820 (D. Mich. 1966) (apply-
ing Indiana law).
recovered in a prior suit for injuries
received in an auto accident. Noting
that under controlling precedent plaintiff's
cause of action would require dismissal,
the court, citing Hitaffer, initially stated
that "modern concepts of the marital
relationship do not allow such anachron-
istic practices to be perpetuated in the
law." 5  The court noted that under
state law two theories had been advanced
as bases for the denial of the wife's
cause of action: first, that any interest
the wife had in the marriage was the
result of a contract of bargain and sale
into which the law would not inquire
absent a showing of grave necessity;
and second, that the action for con-
sortium was based entirely on serv-
ices and thus recovery had been denied
where the sole loss had been only the
sentimental aspect of consortium. The
court answered both of these claims by
stating that
to grant a husband the right to sue on
this right while denying the wife access
to the courts in the assertion of this right
is too clearly a violation of Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection guarantees
to require citation of authority. 0
Again, this opinion also deserves criti-
cism for its statement of so important a
conclusion without supplying the under-
lying rationale used to determine the ap-
plicability of the equal protection clause.
Indiana state law again came under
scrutiny in Karczewski v. Baltimore and
Ohio R.R.,6 1 where the analysis of the
applicability of the equal protection clause
i'ld. at 821.
3' Id.
rt 274 F. Supp. 169 (N.D. I11. 1967) (apply-
ing Indiana law).
to the consortium area seems to parallel
Hitaffer in the extension of protection
for the wife's marital interest. Plain-
tiffs, husband and wife, sued for both
personal injuries and loss of consortium,
respectively, arising out of an automobile-
train wreck in which the husband suf-
fered permanent injuries including im-
potency. The court stated that the dis-
crimination in allowing only a husband's
consortium action could be sustained if
the classification were drawn on some
basis not so unreasonable as to be arbi-
trary.62  It interpreted the equal protec-
tion clause as distinguishing the stand-
ards to be employed, depending upon
the nature of the infringed rights, careful
scrutiny being required where civil rights
were threatened, but a somewhat less
rigorous guide necessary if only eco-
nomic interests were involved. While
the court felt the suit in issue to be in
the latter category, that is, a tenable
economic classification, it noted that the
Supreme Court, though with reluctance,
had, upon occasion, struck down state
imposed economic classifications as viola-
tive of equal protection. 3  The court
went on to find that further denial of
the wife's cause of action had no basis
21!The equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment does not take from the State the
power to classify in the adoption of police
laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide
scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids
what is done only when it is without any
reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbi-
trary. Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). Accord, McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
cSee, e.g., Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457
(1957) (struck down statute exempting Ameri-
can Express Company from regulations ap-
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in reason. It quickly disposed of the
defendant's contention that the high
court had never found a law distinguish-
ing on the basis of sex violative of the
fourteenth amendment, stating that all
cases reviewed by that court had a func-
tional basis related to physical character-
istics of the sexes-an element not pres-
ent in the case at bar. Thus it held
that as the interest of each spouse in
the marital relationship was equal, denial
of the wife's right to bring an action for
loss of consortium violated equal pro-
tection guarantees.
Commentary
At this point, attention should focus
on the problems that have arisen in cer-
tain areas from the failure of the courts
to recognize that injury to the husband
gives rise to a separate and dis-
tinct cause of action to the wife. How-
ever, initially what is largely a procedural
difficulty will be discussed so that given
the distinctness of the two rights, they
may be implemented without abuse.
TI'hereafter, the effects of nonrecognition
of the distinct rights on three major areas
will be viewed: imputed negligence,
workmen's compensation and wrongful
death. Then attention will be directed to
the newly found role of the fourteenth
amendment in extending the wife's cause
of action in these areas. Finally, an
attempt will be made to speculate on the
reasons for the current "flurry" of ac-
tivity in this area.
plicable to all other issuers of money orders);
Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S.
562 (1949) (tax payable only by foreign
corporations doing business within the state
held unconstitutional).
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Perhaps one of the more realistic ar-
guments militating against allowing sepa-
rate suit by the wife has been the fear
that, viewed over all, the spouses will
receive greater compensation than their
actual injuries merit. This is not to be
con-fused with the view that should the
cause of action be allowed, there are
two recoveries for one injury. What is
being considered here is the desire to
insure that each individual spouse, while
legitimately entitled to recover for his
own injury, will not be compensated for
more than his own suffering because of
jury generosity and inaccurate specula-
tion concerning the extent of the other
spouse's recovery in a prior suit. This
difficulty would seem easily remedied in
either of two ways: first, requiring that
trial judges be more meticulous in their
preparation of jury charges so that, as-
suming husband and wife choose to bring
two separate actions, the jury clearly
understands the exact nature of the in-
jury for which it is to compensate; 4 or
second, requiring that both spouses jointly
bring suit, there thus being no chance
of jury confusion, and barring any sub-
sequent suit by either of the spouses.
This latter solution has, in fact, been
followed by some states which have
granted the wife her desired cause of
action.6"
Thus, with a possible solution avail-
able for the procedural difficulties that
04 Cooney v. Moomaw, 109 F. Supp. 448 (D.
Mont. 1953).
65 Deems v. Western Maryland Ry., 247 Md.
95, 231 A.2d 514 (1967); Ekalo v. Con-
structive Serv. Corp., 46 N.J. 82, 215 A.2d 1
(1965).
In Miran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co.,
34 Wis. 2d 542, 150 N.W.2d 137 (1967) this
can be encountered in implementing the
wife's cause of action, the next question
will be a consideration of the logic under-
lying the substantive bars erected against
its implementation. The first of these
bars is imputed negligence, usually aris-
ing in the area of contributory negli-
gence. In regard to loss of consortium,
the prevailing rule is that a wife will be
precluded by a judgment in an action
for or against her husband with respect
to any right or interest which she claims
through or under him. 66  This is of
course completely illogical and rests on
ihe notion that one spouse merely takes
a piece of the other spouse's cause of
action, a view that probably originated
from the time when husband and wife
were conceived of as one entity. Neg-
ligence should not be imputed to the
wife unless she would be liable to third
persons in the event her husband is
liable, which is no longer the case.67
Nor is res judicata applicable since, al-
though the issues are the same, the par-
ties differ and no privity exists between
them.
view was also adopted but was later modified
in Fitzgerald v. Meissner & Hicks, Inc., 38
Wis.2d 571, 157 N.W.2d 595 (1968) to
obviate this requirement where, because of
procedural obstacles or unwillingness, the hus-
band would not aid the wife in the assertion
of her claim.
6r Sisemore v. Neal, 236 Ark. 574, 367 S.W.2d
417 (1963). Accord, Hall v. United States,
266 F. Supp. 671 (D. Mont. 1967); Stenta v.
Leblang, 185 A.2d 759 (Del. 1962) (dictum);
Manley v. Horton, 414 S.W.2d 254 (Mo. 1967)
(inconsistent verdicts giving husband injury re-
covery but denying wife's consortium action
required reversal); Ross v. Cuthbert, 239 Ore.
429, 397 P.2d 529 (1964).
67See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, THE LAW OF
TORTS §8.9, at 640 (1956).
6 Id.
It is submitted that the previous dis-
cussion amplifies the reason for allow-
ing the wife to take free of her husband's
contributory negligence. It must be re-
membered that the reasoning behind the
doctrine lies in the fact that by the in-
terposition of the husband's conduct, the
proximate causal connection between the
defendant's negligence and the physical
injury has been broken.6" Thus the
husband is, in effect, prevented from
profiting by his own wrong. However,
this should not be translated into bar-
ring the wife, who has herself been free
from contributory negligence, from re-
covering from the tortfeasor. As to her,
the causal connection between the de-
fendant's negligence and her injury has
not been broken.
[T]he wife's loss is just as real as it is
distinct. She can no longer enjoy her
legally sanctioned and morally proper
privilege of copulation or procreation,
and is otherwise deprived of her full
enjoyment of her marital state. These
are her rights, not his.70
Whatever the reasoning behind such
court denial, and whether it can stand in
light of new constitutional interpretations,
the fact still remains that if the tort is
viewed, as it must be, as giving rise to
two separate and distinct causes of ac-
tion, the contributory negligence of one
spouse which precludes recovery in his
own right, cannot serve to exculpate the
defendant from the wrong committed
against the other spouse.
69 C. BEACH, CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE § 13
(2d ed. 1892).
70Yonner v. Adams, 53 Del. 229, 251, 167
A.2d 717, 728 (1961).
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A second obstacle to prevent recovery
due to failure to understand the in-
dependent nature of the loss sustained
by the wife, has been the "exclusive
remedy" clauses of workmen's compen-
sation statutes."' The first court which
considered this issue, after having allowed
the wife's cause of action, was Hitafler
discussed above. The statute there in
question provided that the "liability of an
employer . . . shall be exclusive and in
place of all other liability of such
employer to the employee, his legal
representative, husband or wife . .. ."12
While the court found the Act could
only mean that it would "vitiate any
right of action flowing from the com-
pensable injury... ,"3 it felt that the
71 Cases arising under state workmen's com-
pensation statutes, the Federal Employers Lia-
bility Act and the Jones Act are included in
the general heading of workmen's compensa-
tion.
Oddly enough, despite the wide variation
in the wording of the statutes, recovery has
been either granted or denied strictly on the
particular court's conception of whether the
action was independent or derivative. No
attempt has been made to circumvent the
statutes on the basis of their narrowness or
all encompassing nature when dealing with
consortium. Compare Hartman v. Cold Spring
Granite Co., 247 Minn. 515, 77 N.W.2d 651
(1956) (recovery denied) arising under MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 176.031 (1966), formerly MNN.
STAT. ANN. § 176.04 (1949), providing that
"[t]he liability of an employer . . . is ex-
clusive and in place of any other liability to
such employe, his personal representative, sur-
viving spouse..." with the results reached
under 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1964) in Hitaffer v.
Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
7233 U.S.C. §905 (1964).
73Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 819
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
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foregoing principle could not be strictly
applied since
even though the operative facts out of
which this independent right and cor-
relative duty arose are the same as those
out of which the injured employee re-
covers under the Act, the Act does not
proscribe the third person's cause of ac-
tion.74
Finally, the court felt that the statute in
question could not cut off the independent
causes of actions of third persons simply
because the Act did not compensate them
for their loss.
Unfortunately, this latter portion of the
Hitafler decision was short-lived and over-
ruled in Smither and Company, Inc. v.
Coles." The court considered unneces-
sary a determination of whether the wife's
cause of action was independent or de-
rivative in nature, for in any event "all
the rights of 'husband or wife' are
merged into the exclusive remedy pro-
vided by the Act. .... ", 76 Thus, to the
court, it seemed that in the context of
this statute the claim of the husband or
wife could not be viewed as one of a
third person to whom separate legal rights
would attach.
A strong dissenting opinion reiterated
the position of Hitaffer that the wrong
was a separate and independent tort to
the wife, doing so on three bases: first,
that an attempted statutory amendment
by Congress to overrule that portion of
7. Id. at 819-20 (emphasis added).
-5242 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
354 U.S. 914 (1957).
-61d. at 225.
Hitager relating to the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act had failed; second, that the
wife was given no quid pro quo for her
excluded claim; and third, that since an
employee is restored to his tort action at
law in the event the employer failed to
contribute to the fund, the wife's cause of
action should here also be barred where
the employee sues at law if the exclusive
remedy feature really had the meaning
that the majority had attached to it.
Subsequently, recovery was denied in
most cases where the issue arose.7 1 In-
terestingly enough, two arose in Oregon,",
the only state with a statute expressly
authorizing recovery for loss of con-
sortium by the wife.7 9  Despite the
statute, one case viewed the workmen's
compensation recovery as exclusive for
the "workman for himself, his wife and
child . .. [it being] 'in lieu of all claims
against his employer .. "', 10 while an-
other case, arising under the Federal
Employers Liability Act,81 noted that the
Act had previously been viewed as an
7 Hartman v. Cold Spring Granite Co., 247
Minn. 515, 77 N.W.2d 651 (1956); Kinney
v. Southern Pac. Co., 232 Ore. 322, 375 P.2d
418 (1962); Ellis v. Fallert, 209 Ore. 406,
307 P.2d 283 (1957).
7 Kinney v. Southern Pac. Co., 232 Ore. 322,
375 P.2d 418 (1962); Ellis v. Fallert, 209
Ore. 406, 307 P.2d 283 (1957).
7
-ORE. REV. STAT. § 108.010 (1967):
[A]l1 civil rights belonging to the husband
not conferred upon the wife prior to June
14, 1941, or which she does not have at
common law, hereby are conferred upon her,
including, among other things, the right of
action for loss of consortium of her husband.
S Ellis v. Fallert, 209 Ore. 406, 417, 307
P.2d 283, 288 (1957).
Si45 U.S.C. §51 et seq. (1964).
exclusive remedy by the United States
Supreme Court. 2
This latter argument seems especially
meritorious to those advocating the ex-
clusivity of workmen's compensation re-
covery even for claims of loss of con-
sortium, especially in light of New York
Central & Hudson River Railway v. Ton-
sellito.13 There the Supreme Court held
that where plaintiff minor was awarded
damages under the Federal Employers
Liability Act for personal injuries sus-
tained in the course of his employment,
it precluded any recovery by the father
for medical expenses and loss of services
since the Act was exclusive in its coverage
and no other causes of action could be
added thereto by state law.
However, there are reasons why this
analogy should not be drawn. First, the
Court was concerned with a statute ap-
plicable to interstate commerce, the real
question being whether states were free to
supplement a federal statute which Con-
gress had declared to be the exclusive
remedy. Of course, the decision of
Congress preempted the area.8 4 Secondly,
while that Court was concerned with the
question of statutory construction, an
entirely different question would have been
presented if the statute were viewed as
infringing basic constitutional rights.
The only case thus far allowing re-
82 Kinney v. Southern Pac. Co., 232 Ore. 322,
375 P.2d 418 (1962) citing New York Central
& Hudson River R.R. v. Tonsellito, 244 U.S.
360 (1917). Accord, Louisville & Nashville
R.R. v. Lunsford, 216 Ga. 289, 116 S.E.2d
232 (1960).
83244 U.S. 360 (1917).
84See generally N. DOWLING & G. GUNTHER,
CASES AND MATERIAL ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
798 (7th ed. 1965).
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covery despite a local workman's com-
pensation statute is Biddle v. Edward
Hines Lumber Co.", The court held that
plaintiff wife had a good cause of action
for loss of consortium resulting from
negligent injury to her husband even
though at the time of his injury he was
acting within the scope of his employ-
ment. However, the facts here seem
significant in allowing the action since
plaintiff's husband was engaged in a
hazardous occupation and the defendant
had failed to exercise the higher degree of
care required by statute. In dismissing
defendant's contention that his liabilities
under the statute were already greater
than at common law, the court reasoned
that
[i]t would be untenable to say that a
wife would enjoy the right of action for
loss of consortium of her husband when
merely the common law rights of the
husband were violated, and deny the
right when the rights of the husband,
measured by a higher degree of care
owed to him are violated.86
Thus it seems that the preceding case was
a clear example of a particular circum-
stance where the injury to the spouse
was "such an independent violation of
duty [owing to the wife] that its abroga-
tion was not contemplated by the exclu-
sive remedy provision." 87 It is sub-
85219 F. Supp. 69 (D. Ore. 1962).
Sld. at 71.
87 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION §66.00 (1961). The author there
provides many examples of conduct not in-
tended to fall within the exclusive remedy pro-
visions of the statutes including emotional in-
jury to the wife resulting in her miscarriage
caused by viewing her physically mutilated hus-
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mitted, however, that on the basis of the
previous discussion, it seems evident that
such additional factors should not be
necessary before the exclusive remedy
features of the workmen's compensation
acts are overcome since the requirement
of an independent violation of duty is
satisfied by the tort directed at the wife's
interest in the marital relationship.
A third area where a wife's recovery
for loss of consortium has not been
recognized as a distinct and separate in-
jury is the wrongful death action. At
common law, no civil action could be
maintained for the death of a human
being caused by a wrongful act.88 This
was changed by Lord Campbell's Act
which allowed an action by the personal
representative of the deceased to com-
pensate for such damages as the spouse
and heirs were believed to have incurred
by the victim's death, measured in terms
of the economic benefit he would have
conferred upon them during the remainder
of his lifetime had he not been killed. 89
As the common law was unconcerned with
relational torts,"0 as evidenced by the
denial of the wife's cause of action for
loss of consortium, the rule limiting re-
covery in wrongful death actions to the
economic benefit that would have been
band, loss of services to parents because of
physical injury to their minor child, and loss
of support by wife and child because of
spouse's becoming addicted to intoxicating
liquors. Id. at § 66.30.
88 C. BURDICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 36, at 290
(4th ed. 1926).
SW. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 121, at
928 (3d ed. 1964).
90 Prosser defines "relational interests" as "the
relation in which the plaintiff stands toward
one or more third persons." Id. § 118, at 895.
conferred during the lifetime of the in-
jured party seems rational.91 However,
applying this reasoning today to a re-
lational interest seems unacceptable since,
as previously discussed, the one physical
injury has given rise to a tort against two
distinct interests. 92
These acts were not intended to bar in-
dependent actions that may have accrued
simultaneously. . . . It is illogical to
diminish a tortfeasor's liability for senti-
mental injury where he successfully kills
instead of merely injuring the spouse. 93
Failure to recognize the distinction has
led to dismissal of loss of consortium
suits on either of two grounds. In the
first instance, courts have refused to
permit recovery in excess of pecuniary
loss,8 4 and in the second, for any losses
other than between the time of injury
and the time of death 95 whereupon the
wrongful death statute becomes applic-
able. To sum up: both the statutes and
the decisions interpreting them have suf-
fered from a lack of foresight as to the
problems which would arise, and from an
excess of timidity in compensating the
bereaved fantily.0
91Note, A Consideration of the Problems In
Consortium Recovery, 30 IND. L.J. 276, 283
(1955).
921 d. at 284.
93 d.
0 Brown v. Curtin & Johnson, Inc., 117 F.
Supp. 830 (D.D.C. 1954); Hoekstra v. Helge-
land, 78 S.D. 82, 98 N.W.2d 669 (1959).
95 Burk v. Anderson, 232 Ind. 77, 109 N.E.2d
407 (1952) (recovery denied since such time
was a matter of hours and consortium loss, if
such a right existed, had to be zero under the
circumstances).
96 W. PROSSER, supra note 119, at 937.
In summary, courts have erected at
least three additional bars to the wife's
cause of action: imputed negligence;
workmen's compensation; and wrongful
death. The question now presented is
whether there is a means whereby this
problem can be overcome. A plausible
solution may well be the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. At
the very least, this guarantee requires that
all persons similarly situated be reason-
ably classified if a different treatment is
to be afforded different classes. 7  Can
the overwhelming denial of the wife's
consortium action be considered a reason-
able classification in light of present day
consortium concepts? While it is of
course true that the Supreme Court has
not as yet found a law which distinguishes
on the basis of sex to be violative of the
fourteenth amendment,",s the amendment
may well be applicable in cases of sex
discrimination.9"
Cases heard before the Supreme Court
in this century have uniformly upheld sex
as a reasonable basis of distinction in
certain areas. In Muller v. Oregon,"
the Court upheld a state law imposing
maximum hours for women in certain
industries "to secure a real equality of
right for women in the unequal struggle
for subsistence" and because of "the re-
, Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection
of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 344
(1949).
!", Karczewski v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 274
F. Supp. 169, 178 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
91, Murray & Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law:
Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 34 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 232, 238 (1965).
100208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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lation of woman's health needs to her
maternal functions and the public interest
in preserving 'the well-being of the
race.' " 101 However, in cases where the
distinction is not drawn along the lines
of such functional attributes, it is not at
all clear that it is also reasonable. Courts
on both the state 102 and federal 103 level
have readily struck down blatently dis-
criminatory laws wherever they have ap-
peared. Therefore, it appears that the
Supreme Court has never struck down a
classification on the basis of sex as dis-
criminatory simply because the issue has
never been placed before it. Were such
an issue presented, the Court in all prob-
ability would strike down the discrimina-
tion as violative of the equal protection
clause in the same manner as in the
school segregation"' and reapportion-
ment 10, cases since all arbitrary class dis-
101 Murray & Eastwood, supra note 99, at 237.
102See, e.g., Shpritzer v. Lang, 32 Misc. 2d
693, 224 N.Y.S.2d 105 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (dic-
tum), modified, 17 App. Div. 2d 285, 234
N.Y.S.2d 285 (1st Dep't 1962), afl'd, 13
N.Y.2d 744, 191 N.E.2d 919, 241 N.Y.S.2d
869 (1963) (refusal to permit policewoman to
take an examination for promotion to the rank
of sergeant had no rational basis). The Court
of Appeals affirmed without reaching the con-
stitutional question.
103See, e.g., Alexander v. Alexander, 140 F.
Supp. 925 (W.D.S.C. 1956) (common law of
Florida which prohibited husband or wife from
suing each other in tort held abrogated by the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment).
104 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
101Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
crimination is within the ambit of the
fourteenth amendment. 106
Parallelling this development, cases
such as Karczewski should be sustained
because of Supreme Court decisions tend-
ing to strike down traditional common-
law rules in all areas where their tend-
ency would be to "violate the substantive
provisions of the Constitution." 107 There
is no reason to believe that the Court
would hold any differently when dealing
with the denial of the wife's cause of
action for loss of consortium.
Conclusion
The ramifications of using the equal
protection clause should be immediately
apparent. Whereas states previously had
the option of extending or denying the
right on the basis of the equitable prin-
ciples outlined by Hitaffer, now, the cause
of action being constitutionally guaranteed
takes priority over any and all incon-
sistent state laws. This would be especi-
ally true in the statutory areas of work-
men's compensation and wrongful death
where state legislative mandates must now
give way to constitutional requirements.
Brief consideration should now be given
as to why there has recently been a sharp
upsurge of activity in this area. First,
106 See the language of Chief Justice Warren in
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
"The Fourteenth Amendment is not directed
solely against discrimination due to a 'two-class
theory'... that is based upon differences
between 'white' and Negro." Id. at 478.
107 Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60
COLUM. L. REV. 1083, 1108-09 (1960). See,
e.g., Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
(restrictive covenants in deeds unconstitutional);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964) (false criticism of public officials not
libel absent actual malice).
by analogy, recent years have shown in-
creased activity in expanding liability for
either personal, property, or economic
harm and courts have shown increasing
liberality in allowing recovery wherever a
wrong has been committed. 0 Second, the
fall of the impact rule, thereby allowing
recovery for physical injury caused by
emotional distress, 0 9 opens the door
toward eventually allowing recovery for
the mere sentimental aspects of the con-
sortium relationship. Furthermore, this
is an extremely civil rights conscious era,
as evinced by Supreme Court decisions
in the criminal area, by extensive civil
rights demonstrations and, of course, the
drive for absolute equality by the female
population itself.
Other more speculative explanations
that might be offered as catalysts in the
extension of the wife's cause of action
might be the desire to overcome inade-
quate workmen's compensation awards,
wrongful death statutory limitations, and
inordinately low insurance settlements with
the physically injured spouse. While this
listing is not intended to be exclusive,
these explanations may indeed represent
some of the major reasons for the even-
tual extension of the consortium action.
Reasons that have militated against the
extension of the right may be the fear of
increased court congestion and the fear
108 See, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 63
Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17
(1965); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc.,
44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Goldberg
v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432,
191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
'o See, e.g., Battala v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237,
176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
of excessive damages. These problems
seem easily surmountable by requiring a
joinder of the wife's cause of action with
that of her husband, by extending the
use of insurance, and through careful jury
instructions.
In short, no legitimate reason can be
given to withstand the weight of the
inescapable conclusion that the wife's right
is a tort separate and apart from that of
her husband against which needless bars
have been erected to deny her recovery.
Fortunately, some courts have recognized
MORALITY AND ABORTION LAWS
(Continued)
to permit the extermination of undesirable
and unwanted human beings.
It seems self-evident that this challenge
is unique in American Catholic experi-
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this and have begun to update their pro-
tection of consortium in keeping with its
modem definition. Those courts which
have not recognized the modern concept
of a co-equal interest in the marital re-
lationship and have discriminatorily pro-
tected interests therein, will be forced to
grant the wife a cause of action for loss
of consortium upon negligent injury to
her husband. Antiquated tort notions
can prove no bar to modem constitutional
mandates.
ence, that it is awesome and that it is
inescapable. Hopefully, it is a challenge
which, unlike any previous challenge, will
arouse the minds and consciences of
American Catholics to original, creative
thought on a legal-moral problem of in-
calculable significance.
